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Friedman and began to strike down major federal laws regulating
the corporate and consumer markets. If, as Mr. Justice Holmes
said, the United States Constitution does not "enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics"' 153 let us hope that the B.N.A. Act does
not enact Milton Friedman's Free to Choose.
Comment on James C. MacPherson's Paper on
Economic Regulation and The British North America
Act
Peter W. Hogg*
Introduction
I agree with nearly everything Professor MacPherson has
written in his excellent paper. This makes me a rather poor
commentator. However, I shall try and briefly summarize what I
see as the overall effect of the recent decisions of the Supreme
Court of Canada. In this I shall be repeating points made more
fully by Professor MacPherson, but with perhaps some minor
changes of emphasis.
The general effect of the recent decisions is to reduce each of
the principal federal powers of economic regulation. This has
occurred through two developments: an explicit narrowing of
each of the principal federal powers, and the introduction of
uncertainty (or, in some cases, confusion) to the new, narrower
definitions. The former development is good or bad, depending
upon one's assessment of the desirability of national economic
regulation: for those who (unlike me) believe that most economic
regulation is best undertaken by the provinces the narrowing of
the federal powers will be good. However, the resulting uncertainty cannot be defended. It reflects a failure by the Supreme
Court of Canada to be consistent in the way in which it has
defined the principal federal powers. This must have the effect of
inhibiting provincial as well as federal initiatives until the new
demarcation of responsibility between the two levels of
government has been better settled.
153Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, presently Visiting
Professor of Law at University of Victoria, Victoria, B.C.
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Peace, Order, and Good Government
The narrowing of the federal power over peace, order, and
good government took place in the Anti-Inflation Reference.I
While the federal wage and price controls were upheld on the
dubious basis that double-digit inflation could be regarded as an
emergency, the decision imposed two important restrictions on
the p.o.g.g. power. First, all of the judges said that legislation
enacted under the emergency branch of p.o.g.g. must be temporary: apparently permanent measures of a preventive character
cannot be enacted under the emergency power. Secondly, five of
the judges said that the national concern branch of p.o.g.g. was
definitely not available to authorize the wage and price controls.
This was on the basis that inflation was too broad and vague a
conception to serve as a "matter" of legislative power. The result
is rather extraordinary. It means that Canada cannot have a
permanent prices and incomes policy. The federal Parliament
cannot enact one, and no provincial policy could be effective.
This gap in legislative power has not attracted many mourners
because of the general unpopularity of prices and incomes
policies. But I think that we should all be disturbed that there is
such a major gap in legislative capacity.
The confusion in the p.o.g.g. power did not stem from the
Anti-Inflation Reference. Indeed, the opinion of Beetz J.was a
valiant attempt to synthesize the cases. However, one should
note the obscurity of Laskin C.J.'s opinion, evidently disagreeing
with Beetz J.'s attempt to define the national concern branch but
refusing to articulate his own opinion. Perhaps that refusal
contributed to the later events. The confusion started in R. v.
Hauser2 when four of the seven judges unexpectedly upheld the
Narcotic Control Act under the national concern branch of
p.o.g.g., instead of under the criminal law power. Pigeon J. for
this majority articulated a new definition of the national concern
branch, namely, "a genuinely new problem which did not exist at
confederation". 3 He approved the Russell case, 4 despite the fact
IReference re Anti-Inflation Act (1976), 68 D.L.R. (3d) 452, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, 9 N.R.
541.
2(1979), 98 D.L.R. (3d) 193, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 984, 46 C.C.C. (2d) 481, 8 C.R. (3d) 89,
[1979] 5 W.W.R. 1,26 N.R. 541.
3Ibid., at p. 210 D.L.R., p. 1000 S.C.R.
4Russell v. The Queen (1882), 7 App. Cas. 829.
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that liquor abuse was obviously not "a genuinely new problem
which did not exist at confederation". And he made no reference
to the Anti-Inflation Reference in which no judge had suggested
the relevance of an historical newness test, and in which the
majority had disapproved the Russell case.
I thought that this was confusing until the decision of the court
in Labatt Breweries v. A.-G. Can.,5 in which Estey J. for the
majority suggested yet another test for the national concern
branch: " 'a need for one national law which cannot realistically
be satisfied by cooperative provincial action' ".6 1 cannot criticize
the substance of this test, since Estey J. took it from my book!
But I can and do criticize Estey J.'s failure to cite either the AntiInflation Reference or Hauseror to explain how his test could be
reconciled with the latter of those cases.
The state of doctrine on the national concern branch of the
p.o.g.g. power can only be regarded as a shambles. It is imposci~etc
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branch will or will not sustain a proposed federal policy. The
federal Parliament cannot rely upon this power until it has been
clarified. However, I dread the thought of yet another "clarification" by yet another judge.
Trade and Commerce
The federal power over "interprovincial and international"
trade and commerce has been narrowed by Dominion Stores Ltd.
v. The Queen. 7 The refusal of the court in that case to uphold Part
I of the Canada Agricultural Products Standards Act, when it
seems so clearly essential to the effective operation of Part II of
the Act, seems to be a reversion to the Privy Council's "watertight compartments". The only cases cited by Estey J. were the
old Privy Council cases which had denied federal power to affect
local trade even as an incident of the regulation of interprovincial
and international trade. His failure to cite the decisions of the
Supreme Court of Canada which had rejected that narrow view of
federal power, for example, Murphy,8 Klassen9 (where leave to
5 (1979), 110 D.L.R. (3d) 594, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 914, 52 C.C.C. (2d) 433, 49 C.P.R. (2d)
179, 9 B.L.R. 181,30N.R. 496.
6 Ibid., at p. 627 D.L.R., p. 945 S.C.R., quoting P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of
259 6
- 1.
Canada (1977), at pp.
7 (1979), 106 D.L.R. (3d) 581, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 844, 50 C.C.C. (2d) 277, 30 N.R. 399.
8 Murphy v. C.P.R. (1958), 15 D.L.R. (2d) 145, [1958] S.C.R. 626,77 C.R.T.C. 322.
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appeal was denied), Caloil'0 and the Ontario Egg Reference,"
would seem to indicate a deliberate return to pre-1949 doctrine.
However, the present state of the law is confused, not only by the
surprising failure to refer to the recent cases, but also by an even
more surprising statement near the end of the opinion, where
Estey J. says that "it may well be" that his account of the law in
the earlier part of the opinion "is not now a correct description of
the federal power under s. 91(2)".12
The federal power over "general" trade and commerce has also
been narrowed by Dominion Stores Ltd. v. The Queen. 3 The
refusal by the majority to follow the CanadaStandard case,' 4 the
only unequivocal example of the use of the general trade and
commerce power, is close to overruling that case, because the two
statutory schemes are so similar. Labatt Breweries v. A. -G.Can. "5
is less similar because the federal standards were tied to the use of
common names such as "light beer" rather than distinctive names
such as "Canada Standard" or "Canada Extra Fancy". In that
case Estey J. for the majority said that the general trade and
commerce power would authorize legislation that "affected
industry at large or in a sweeping, general sense";16 but it is quite
unclear what, if anything, that means. After all, the Food and
Drugs Act and Regulations cover most of the foods and drugs in
daily use; yet they do not qualify as sufficiently "sweeping" or
"general", apparently because the Regulations (not the Act) are
drafted on a commodity-by-commodity basis.
Criminal Law
The federal power over criminal law has been narrowed by R.
v. Hauserand Labatt Breweries v. A. -G. Can. In Hauserthe court
held that the Narcotic Control Act was not valid under the
criminal law power, although it was valid under the peace, order,
9R. v.Klassen (1959),20 D.L.R. (2d)406,31 C.R. 275, 29 W.W.R.369 (Man. C.A.).
10Caloil Inc. v. A.-G. Can. (1971), 20 D.L.R. (3d) 472, [1971] S.C.R. 543, [1971] 4

W.W.R. 37.
I Reference re Agricultural Products Marketing Act and two other Acts (1978), 84 D.L.R.
(3d) 257, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198, 19 N.R. 361.
12Supra, footnote 7at p. 599 D.L.R., p. 866 S.C.R.
13Supra, footnote 7.
14A.-G. Ont. v.A.-G. Can., [1937] I D.L.R. 702, [1937] A.C. 405, 67 C.C.C. 342, [1937]
1W.W.R. 333.
15 Supra, footnote 5.
16Supra, footnote 5 at p. 626 D.L.R., 943 S.C.R.
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and good government power. This holding was inconsistent with
the case law under both powers. The exclusion from the criminal
law power was based on the regulatory features of the Narcotic
Control Act, although most of its provisions are directed to the
prohibition of illicit drugs - a typically criminal purpose.
In Labatt Breweries v. A. -G. Can. the compositional standards
for food enacted under the federal Food and Drugs Act were held
to be invalid. Arguments seeking to support the Act under the
peace, order, and good government power and under the trade
and commerce power were rejected, as well as arguments based
on the criminal law power. The court denied that the compositional standards were directed to the prevention of deception, but
the denial seems implausible. Full disclosure of ingredients on a
product label may not suffice to prevent deception (as the court
implies). It is at least a rational judgment by the Parliament that
consumers sometimes do not read or understand labels and
should be able to count on the fact that certain products such as
light beer, mayonnaise, hamburger, etc., have certain characteristics. An absence of a stipulated characteristic would have to be
strongly signalled by calling the substandard product by a
different name. To deny that this regime is directed to the
prevention of deception is to substitute the court's opinion as to
the nature of and remedy for consumer deception for that of the
Parliament.
The federal power to enforce criminal law has been left in
doubt by Hauser. Two dissenting judges (Dickson J. with the
agreement of Pratte J.) held that the federal Parliament could not
provide for the enforcement of its own criminal laws.
Enforcement of the criminal law was a provincial responsibility.
The majority of the court (Pigeon J. with the agreement of
Martland, Ritchie and Beetz JJ.) finessed this issue by their
holding that the Narcotic Control Act was not a criminal law.
Since the Narcotic Control Act was not a criminal law it was not
necessary to decide whether the federal Parliament could provide
for the enforcement of criminal law. However, by obviously
straining to avoid deciding the point, the majority left open the
possibility that Dickson J.'s dissenting view may become the
established doctrine. Only Spence J. in a separate concurring
opinion rejected Dickson J.'s view. The absence of enforcement
power would be a serious impediment to federal economic
regulation under the criminal law power. For the present, the
state of the law is uncertain.

